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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal, set against a backdrop of the litigants’ personal and professional 
rancor, pertains to two awards of attorneys’ fees and costs to the appellees.  Plaintiffs 
Edson R. Arneault and Gregory J. Rubino brought several claims against defendants 
Leonard G. Ambrose, Nicholas C. Scott, and Scott’s Bayfront Development, Inc. 
(collectively, “the defendants”), and others.  The District Court dismissed all of the 
claims, and the defendants were awarded fees and costs in an unspecified amount.  The 
parties disputed the correct amount of fees and costs, and they were consequently ordered 
to participate in a settlement conference.  At the conference, the presiding Magistrate 
Judge found that Arneault and Rubino participated in bad faith; therefore, the defendants 
were awarded fees and costs for both the underlying litigation and for that conference.  
Arneault and Rubino now appeal these awards.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 As this Opinion is non-precedential and we write mainly for the parties, our 
factual recitation is abbreviated.  In 2001, Arneault and Rubino entered into an agreement 
regarding the development of Presque Isle Downs (“Presque Isle”), a racetrack and 
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casino in Erie, Pennsylvania.  Arneault was Chief Executive Officer of MTR Gaming 
Group Inc. (“MTR”) — the firm that operated Presque Isle — and Rubino operated 
Tecnica Development Corp. (“Tecnica”), a real estate development firm.  In return for 
Tecnica’s services, MTR contracted, inter alia, to remit 3% of Presque Isle’s earnings to 
Tecnica for a twenty-year term. 
In the underlying civil action, Arneault and Rubino alleged that the Pennsylvania 
Gaming Control Board (“PGCB”) intentionally defeated the purpose of their arrangement 
by imposing unusual licensing requirements and ultimately prohibiting MTR from 
conducting business with Tecnica or Rubino.  Rubino and Tecnica’s successor-in-interest 
petitioned the PGCB for relief from that prohibition in February 2008.  The PGCB 
decided to hold its decision on that relief in abeyance pending Rubino’s submission of a 
new license application, and they required MTR to sponsor the application.  The 
plaintiffs argue that this sponsorship requirement “intentionally placed Rubino in an 
impossible situation” because “the PGCB Commissioners knew that great animosity 
existed between Rubino and the management of MTR at that time such that MTR would 
never sponsor such an application.”  Pl. Br. 7.1  Ultimately, Rubino’s license was 
renewed; however, he contends that he suffered business, reputational, and financial harm 
in the process.  Pl. Br. 6. 
While Rubino grappled with the PGCB, Arneault was engaged in another 
disagreement with that entity.  In April 2008, he applied “to renew his license as an 
                                              
1 References herein to appellants’ brief on appeal are cited to “Pl. Br.” 
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officer, director and principal shareholder of MTR” in accordance with the Pennsylvania 
Race Horse Development and Gaming Act.  Arneault retired from MTR several months 
later.  Pl. Br. 8.  He argues that, despite his retirement, the PGCB “continued to require 
him to renew his license in order for MTR’s own license renewal to proceed.”  Pl. Br. 8.  
Thereafter, the PGCB conducted an investigation into his renewal application and issued 
a report that recommended its denial.  Pl. Br. 8.  The report specified that Arneault 
provided “false and misleading statements to the PGCB.”  Pl. Br. 8–9. 
According to Arneault and Rubino, the plot thickened in summer 2006 when 
Ambrose — a criminal defense attorney — “met with PGCB agents . . . and falsely 
accused Rubino of being a member of the Mafia.”  Pl. Br. 9.  In short, the substance of 
their allegations is that Ambrose misrepresented lawful business activity to the PGCB in 
order “to fulfill an earlier threat to ‘get’ Rubino.”  Pl. Br. 9. 
In 2007, Ambrose began representing Scott’s Bayfront Development, Inc. 
(“Scott’s Bayfront”)2 in a civil action against the Erie County Convention Center 
Authority (“ECCCA”).  Ambrose argued in that case that Rubino and others “improperly 
influenced ECCCA board members to terminate the relationship between the ECCCA 
and Scott’s Bayfront so a proposal offered by Rubino could be accepted.”  Pl. Br. 10. 
Following additional hearings with the PGCB, Arneault and Rubino filed the 
instant action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
bringing federal and state claims against several private and government defendants.  
                                              
2 Appellee Nicholas C. Scott is the principal of Scott’s Bayfront. 
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Relevant to this appeal are Counts X and XI, which rely upon a theory of liability under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Count X alleged a conspiracy to violate First Amendment, Due 
Process, and Equal Protection rights, based on a theory that Ambrose “was an agent of [] 
Nicholas C. Scott and Scott’s Bayfront Development, Inc. [(collectively, “the Scott 
Defendants”)] . . . and was acting within the scope of authority [they] provided” when he 
“conspired with the Government Defendants to deny Mr. Arneault and Mr. Rubino 
protections guaranteed under the . . . United States Constitution.”  App. Vol. III 141.3  
Count XI, which alleged liability for defamation, contended that “Ambrose, for his own 
purposes and as an agent of Defendants Scott and Scott’s Bayfront, made arrangements 
for the delivery of [] illegally-obtained Tecnica and Rubino proprietary and confidential 
information to Government Defendants.”  App. Vol. III 145. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the District Court granted the 
motion.  Arneault v. O’Toole, 864 F. Supp. 2d 361, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2012).  Thereafter, 
Arneault and Rubino appealed, and this Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal.  
Arneault v. O’Toole, 513 F. App’x 195 (3d Cir. 2013).   
The defendants then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs.  A Special Master was 
appointed to recommend findings on that motion.  In his report, the Special Master 
recommended that the defendants were entitled to fees and costs in an amount to be 
determined at a later proceeding.  Magistrate Judge Susan Baxter, to whom the case had 
been transferred by consent of the parties, accepted the report and recommendation with 
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modification.  She then ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference 
before Magistrate Judge Robert Mitchell.  Magistrate Judge Mitchell “found that 
[Arneault and Rubino] stymied any legitimate settlement discussions and participated . . . 
in bad faith,” concluding that fees and costs for this bad faith participation were 
warranted.  App. Vol. III 306.  On that ground, Magistrate Judge Mitchell awarded 
Ambrose $3,946.66 and the Scott Defendants $2,753.37.  App. Vol. III 311.  The initial 
attorneys’ fees petitions then returned to the Special Master, who recommended a 
specific award of fees and costs.  Magistrate Judge Baxter adopted the recommendation 
with modification, awarding Ambrose $79,761.72 and the Scott Defendants $47,179.48.  
App. Vol. I 104.  Following these awards of attorneys’ fees and costs, Arneault and 
Rubino timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the relevant claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees and its imposition of sanctions for 
abuse of discretion.  Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 237 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
A. 
 We first consider whether the award of attorneys’ fees for the main litigation — 
distinct from the sanctioned conduct regarding the settlement conference — constituted 
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an abuse of discretion.4  District courts are entitled to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to 
prevailing defendants in § 1983 matters “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011) 
(quotation omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  We rely on several factors to determine 
whether a § 1983 claim is frivolous, including whether the plaintiff established a prima 
facie case, the defendant offered to settle, the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial, 
and the issue is one of first impression.  See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 
242 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2001).  As we noted in Barnes, these factors “are merely 
guidelines, not strict rules” and courts should make frivolousness determinations on a 
case-by-case basis.  Id. 
 The core of Arneault and Rubino’s position is threefold:  (1) that their claims were 
not frivolous; (2) that the District Court applied improper legal standards; and (3) that the 
award of fees and costs was based in part on the mistaken finding that the plaintiffs had 
not alleged a real threat of injury.  We address these arguments in turn. 
 First, we conclude that the District Court’s finding on frivolousness is consistent 
with the sound exercise of discretion.  Arneault and Rubino argue that they “alleged 
substantial factual support for recognized legal theories,” Pl. Br. 27, and it is clear that 
their amended complaint contained a significant number of factual allegations.  
Nevertheless, the presence of many factual allegations does not alone prohibit a finding 
of frivolousness.  The relevant inquiry is how the alleged facts contribute to the legal 
                                              




theories underpinning the plaintiffs’ claims.  The Special Master’s report, which the 
District Court ultimately adopted, carefully considered the Barnes factors and the 
plaintiffs’ factual allegations.  App. Vol. I 14–23.  The report noted, inter alia, that there 
was no offer to settle, that the lawsuit was dismissed before trial, that the matter did not 
present issues of first impression, and that the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie 
case.  The record contains no reason for us to upset these findings in accordance with the 
District Court’s discretion recognized in Barnes. 
 Second, we conclude that the District Court did not commit reversible error in 
applying the relevant legal standards.  Arneault and Rubino argue that the District Court 
improperly applied the standard for awarding fees applicable to prevailing plaintiffs 
rather than defendants.  We disagree.  The Special Master’s report correctly notes the 
applicable standard for prevailing defendants and — as is required under that standard — 
considered whether Arneault and Rubino’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless. 
We note, however, that the Special Master’s report also includes the following 
quote from a case that applied the standard for prevailing plaintiffs: 
When a statute provides that a court “may” award counsel fees, an exercise 
of judicial discretion is triggered.  Judges are not permitted to act arbitrarily.  
It seems likely, therefore, that when an award is authorized, it will not be 
withheld unless there is some valid reason for denial. 
App. Vol. I 11 (quoting Ellison v. Shenango Inc. Pension Bd., 956 F.2d 1268, 1279 (3d 
Cir. 1992)).  The inclusion of the last sentence, which references the standard for 
plaintiffs, may have been improvident; however, it did not infect the entire report or 
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otherwise necessitate reversal.  The quote is juxtaposed with a paragraph that clearly 
establishes the discretionary standard for prevailing defendants.  Furthermore, the report 
later explains the distinction between the standards and applies the correct one.  As a 
result, the quoted material does not have the significance that Arneault and Rubino 
ascribe to it. 
 Third, we are unconvinced that the District Court erred in finding that Arneault 
and Rubino failed to allege a real threat of injury.  Arneault and Rubino cite the Special 
Master’s report in support of this argument, but the passage cited pertains to other 
defendants in the underlying action, not those relevant to this appeal.  Pl. Br. 36.  When 
actually referring to Ambrose and the Scott Defendants, the report does reveal some 
ambiguity on this factor.  The Special Master describes the parties’ arguments and 
suggests that “[i]t may be appropriate for Plaintiffs to verify . . . assertions about the 
threat of harm and for Defendant Ambrose to have an opportunity to react to the veracity 
of such assertions before these matters are factored into a possible determination that fees 
and costs should be reimbursed.”  App. Vol. I 22–23 (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, 
relying on other factors, the report still recommended the award of fees and costs and the 
District Court adopted the recommendation.  Because, as noted above, the Barnes factors 
“are merely guidelines,” it is not erroneous to rely on other factors without exhaustive 
analysis of this one. 
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 Having carefully considered all of the parties’ arguments,5 we find no abuse of 
discretion with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees for the main litigation. 
B. 
 The remaining issue in this appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
sanctioning Arneault and Rubino for their bad faith participation in the settlement 
conference.  We conclude that there are no grounds for reversal. 
 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(B), district courts “may issue any just orders 
. . . if a party or its attorney . . . is substantially unprepared to participate—or does not 
participate in good faith—in [a pretrial] conference.”  Moreover, courts have “inherent 
authority to impose sanctions upon those who would abuse the judicial process.”  
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1991)). 
 Magistrate Judge Mitchell’s conclusion that Arneault and Rubino acted in bad 
faith was based on a factual finding that they attended the conference but refused to 
participate in negotiations, having failed to communicate adequately and timely that their 
position was fixed prior to the conference.  Supp. App. 47–48.  It would thus seem that 
the surprise to the Court and to the opposing parties was the issue — in other words, the 
conduct was sanctionable because, at significant expense to the judiciary and to opposing 
counsel, a conference was held for no reason.  On appeal, Arneault and Rubino argue that 
they did in fact communicate their fixed position — that they would not negotiate with 
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certain defendants — in a timely manner; however, their citation to the record does not 
support this proposition.  Arneault and Rubino also argue that they would have negotiated 
with Ambrose and the Scott Defendants; however, Magistrate Judge Mitchell noted that 
this argument contradicts their in-chambers statements and that the plaintiffs never asked 
him to resume the settlement discussion with those defendants.  In short, the record offers 
support for Judge Mitchell’s findings and contains nothing that compels us to find error.  
Therefore, we will affirm the imposition of sanctions. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the awards of attorneys’ fees and 
costs. 
